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ANALYSISOF CASH
THE CHANGES IN "FREE" CASH accumulated by large manufactur-
ing corporations during the thirties, which were discussed in the
preceding chapter, may be explained by a variety of factors. One
of the most important of these factors—particularly in an analysis
of changes in the thirties compared with those in the twenties—is
the role of bank debts. Other factors that must be considered,
however, include profits, holdings of marketable securities, and
dividend
THE ROLE OF BANK DEBTS
There are two reasons for paying particular attention to bank
debts among the liabilities of a company, in connection with the
analysis of "free" cash.
First, bank debts can be reduced with great ease at the bor-
rower's initiative, which makes it improbable that they will exist
simultaneously with large amounts of "free" cash. This is not
true to the same extent of other types of liabilities. The use of
accounts payable is a well established trade custom; companies
do not change over to cash payments for the sole reason that
they have "free" cash on their hands. As for tax liabilities, they
rise and fall automatically with net income, provided that tax
rates do not change. Long-term bonds, it is true, can be retired at
the initiative of the company; they can either be called back, if
they are callable, or repurchased in the open market. Ifa corpo-
ration expects to need funds again, it will call bonds only if anew
issue can be floated at a lower interest rate, with due consideration
beitig given to the costs of flotation. The new issue would simply
replace the old one and no retirement of debts would take place.
Only if the company is not in need of funds would the calling in of
bonds lead to a reduction of "free" cash; in this case the existence
of "free" cash may be the reason why the bonds were called at the
particular time. The repurchase of bonds in the open marketpays
only if the market price is below the book value of the bonds. Con-
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sequently, there is no reason to expect companies to retire their
bonds in this fashion merely because they have temporarily "free"
cash, Of course, the existence of "free" cash may possibly coincide
with low bond prices; a repurchase of bonds may then take place,
decreasing the amount of idle cash held by corporations. But in
this case the decisive factor for the repurchase of the debt is the
low level of bond prices and not the existence of "free" cash.1
Second, if a company or a group of companies pays off any
type of liability other than bank debt, cash balances are merely
transferred and no net decline occurs in cash balances in the econ-
omy as a whole. But if bank debt is repaid, a reduction of cash
balances will result unless the banking system replaces bank loans
by other types of assets. This point is of great importance if any
attempt is made to generalize the conclusions that are reached in
our analysis.
During the decade of the twenties, bank credit was of little im-
portance for large manufacturing corporations; bank debt, meas-
ured by notes payable, was reduced sharply throughout that.
period. In 1929, the year before "free" cash began to accumulate,
27 companies out of our sample of 45largemanufacturing cor-
porations had no notes payable. Therefore, when these concerns
became liquid the paying off of bank debt did not provide an outlet
for their excess funds. Total notes payable of the other 18 com-
panies in 1929 amounted to 2.6 percent of their combined total
assets: By 1931, the payables of 8 of these companies had been
reduced to zero, and those of the remaining 10, to 0.7 percent. By
1931theabsolute amount of notes payable for the entire group
of corporations had declined to 21 percent of the 1929 level. Thus
the great liquidity which corporations built up after 1929 was
accompanied by an almost complete disappearance of bank debt.
That bank debt as measured by notes payable does not dis-
appear entirely, in spite of the accumulation of "free" cash, 'can
be ascribed primarily to two circumstances.First, notes payable
do not include only notes payable to banks, although the latter do
constitute the bulk of the total.2It is possible that the relative
1Thelong-term debt of our sample of large manufacturing corporations was
actually reduced during the period 1933-36.
2Foran estimate of the percentage of notes payable due to banks, see Walter A.
Chudson, The Pattern ofCorporateFinancial Structure (National Bureau of Eco-
pomic Research, Financia! Research Program,, 1945) p. 46, especially fn. 3,Analysis of "Free" Cash
decrease of bank debt after 1929 may have been even greater than
the movement of the total of notes payable would lead us to expect.
Second, our figure for "free" cash relates to the aggregateofthe
45 companies. Some of the companies within this group may not
have had "free" cash and, consequently, may have been unable to
reduce their bank debt to zero. These considerations must be kept
in mind particularly for the years after 1932 when notes payable
started to increase although there was still "free" cash in existence.
Those companies increasing their bank debt may not have been
the same as those that still had sufficient cash for expansion of
inventories. Indeed, a detailed examination of the individual com-
panies shows that cash was unequally distributed among them.
The situation in 1921 was quite different. The inventory boom
which had preceded the postwar contraction was financed to a
large extent by bank credit. When the recession came, corpora-
tions were pressed to pay off their bank debts, which resulted in a
precipitate decline of such debts; consequently no "free" cash came
into existence. The amount by which notes payable were reduced
in 1921 was approximately the same as the maximum amount of
"free" cash held by our sample of corporations in the early thirties.
In Chapter 1 it was shown that the cash balances of our sample
of large manufacturing corporations in the thirties behaved dif-
ferently from those of all reporting manufacturing corporations
in that the latter declined after 1929 and the former did not. The
explanation of this difference is found in the fact that by the end
of the twenties large corporations were less dependent on banks
than the average of all corporations. The conclusion follows that
the atypical behavior of the cash balance of our sample of large
corporations in the thirties was mainly attributable to the fact that
bank debt was less important for large concerns than for the cor-
porate universe. However, this assertion cannot be proved statis-
tically since bank debt cannot be segregated from the data in
Statistics of Income, the source for the cash balance figures for all
corporations.8
Summary
(1) The accumulation of "free" cash by large corporations in the depression
of the thirties reflects the fact that at the close of the twenties large cor-
3Neithercan bank debt be segregated for the sample of medium and small manu-
facturing concerns, data for which were obtained from the Wisconsin income tax files.54 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
porations had only a small amount of bank debt. The relatively large
amount of bank debt before the depression of 1920-21, in contrast,
resulted in practically no accumulation of "free" cash in 1921.
(2) The difference between the behavior of cash of large manufac-
turing corporations and those of all reporting manufacturing corpora-
tions in the thirties can very probably be ascribed to the fact that large
corporations were relatively independent of the banks.
THE ROLE OF PROFITS
The connection between general business conditions and liquid-
ity of corporations may be tested by correlating the profits of our
sample of large manufacturing companies with "free" cash. What
is of importance is the expected profit rate; that is, investments
depend on the rate of profit which management expects to make
and not on the profit rate made on previous investments. In this
analysis, however, the actual profit rate must be used, for it is not
possible to measure the expected rate. The limitations of this
approach are recognized; but since the tendency displayed by the
actual profit rate is undoubtedly one of the important factors
shaping plans for the future, itis still sensible to compare the
movement of this rate with that part of the cash balance which
constitutes "free" cash. The profit rate that will be used in the
comparison is the ratio of net income to net worth.
As indicated on Chart 15 the movement of the profit rate from
1929 through 1938 was inverse to that of "free" cash. On the
whole, when the profit rate fell "free" cash rose, and vice versa.
The mechanism that connects the profit rate with "free" cash in
this period is simple. A rising profit rate goes hand in hand with
an expansion of business and, therefore, with a rise of total pay-
ments. As soon as total payments increase, a larger part of a
given cash balance is absorbed by transaction needs, and a smaller
part appears as "free" cash. Thus even if the absolute level of
the cash balance remains about the same, as was the case with the
cash balance for large corporations in the thirties, that component
of it which constitutes "free" cash declines as the profit rate rises,
and advances when the profit rate falls.
In the twenties the rising profit rate for large corporations was
not accompanied by a decline in "free" cash.4 The explanation
4Thereseems to be a negative correlation for minor year-to-year movements of
the profit rate and "free" cash in this period.Analysis of "Free" Cash 55
C/tart15—"FREE" CAsH AND RATIO OF NET INCOME TO NET
WORTH OF SAMPLE OF LARGE MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
(SAMPLE B)
for this lack of correlation has been given in the preceding section:
The upswing in the twenties did not inherit "free" cash from the






The declining profitrate for large manufacturing corporations in
1930-32 and in 1938, unlike 1920-21, gave rise to the accumulation of
"free" cash. The rising profit rate in the middle thirties led to a decline
of "free" cash.56 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43
THE ROLE OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES
An analysis of the movement of marketable securities is difficult
because the information available is insufficient on two vital points.
First, the exact composition of marketable securities is not known.
If the increase during the period 1925-28 is to be judged, a point
of vital importance is to know what part of marketable securities
were stocks, what part bonds, and what part call loans.5 That
stocks might have been bought in the twenties with a view to the
capital gains that could be made is suggested by a comparison of
stock prices and the holdings of marketabJe securities, which shows
a strong correlation between the two throughout that period.6
Second, to what extent the decline that set in after 1928 came from
write-downs of the value of securities and to what extent from
actual sales is not known. An analysis of surplus adjustments in
the years 1929-32 does not reveal any influence of security write-
downs, but this does not prove that they were not made. Indeed, if
it is true that stocks were a part of marketable securities up to
1928, it seems inevitable that security write-downs occurred after
that date. A safe assumption is that during the thirties the com-
position of the security portfolio changed in favor of bonds.
Corporations might be expected to prefer marketable securities
to idle money; it might be argued that a small yield is better than
no yield. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that
in times of a high profit rate on operations, the amount of market-
able securities in the possession of corporations will not rise more
than is necessary to contribute to the liquidity of the company. In
other words, marketable securities would not be expected to rise
relatively more than cash.
The facts are quite contrary to these expectations. Chart 16
shows that our sample of large manufacturing corporations built
up their marketable securities at a more rapid rate than their cash
balances during 1925-28, in spite of high profits on operations. In
the depression of the thirties when the profit rate was low and
"free" cash made itsappearance, marketable securities were
6Callloans were included in marketable securities whenever they were shown
separately in the company reports.
6Mr.A. Kisselgoff investigated this point in detail, and his results are used here.Analysis of "Free" Cash 57
Chart 16—YEAR-END CASH BALANCES AND HOLDINGS OF MAR-
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Inmost years in the period 1929-37, large manufacturing corporations
preferred to draw on their marketable securities instead of cash balances
to finance part of their payments.
liquidated to a considerable extent (with the exception of the years
1931 and
Why did corporations increase their marketable security hold-
ings during the twenties in spite of the high rate of return which
(to judge from the high profit rate on operations) they could
have obtained if they had invested their funds in operating assets?
Since this problem transgresses the topic of the present study, a
detailed analysis will not be attempted here; a few remarks must
suffice.
As already indicated above, rising prices on the stock exchange,
which promised substantial capital gains in addition to dividends,
7 The figures available for the sample of medium-sized and small corporations do
not permit the separation of securities and investments; therefore, the
movement of marketablesecuritiesalone cannot be shown forthis group of
corporations.58 CorporateCash Balances, 1914-43
may have induced corporations to put an increasing part of their
funds into securities. Another factor is that plant expansion of
large industrial concerns proceeded at a comparatively high rate
during the twenties. At such times liquid funds have to be accumu-
lated to prepare for huge payments. If the stock market is favor-
able, corporations may take advantage of the situation by floating
stock even though they may intend to use the money only in the
rather distant future. The funds thus obtained need not be held
in the form of cash but can be invested in securities or lent on call.
In addition, in the later stage of a boom when the economic system
is working at relatively full capacity, an attempt to increase operat-
ing assets may meet with delays, so that accumulated funds in the
meantime either have to be kept idle or have to be invested in
securities. As such investment was profitable in the late twenties,
it is no wonder that corporation funds were put to that use.
The explanation of the liquidation of securities in the thirties
is more difficult.By selling securities before their "free" cash
was exhausted, companies kept their cash balances high, at the
expense of the earnings which they could have obtained from
securities. The preference for cash in the first years after 1929 is
understandable considering the highly unstable condition of the
security market and the extreme uncertainty about the future which
prevailed in those years.Furthermore, interest rates, on the
whole, were falling in the thirties, and therefore bond prices
showed a rising trend.It is well known that from about 1935
onward the opinion was widespread that interest rates could not
stay at the low level which they had reached (or bond prices
remain at their high level). This feeling may not only have pre-
vented corporation officials from investing excess cash in govern-
ment and other bonds, just as it prevented bankers from putting
their excess reserves into fixed interest securities, but it may actu-
ally have induced them to sell bonds in order to realize capital
gains as long as it was still possible to do so. This is particularly
plausible for the years after the bottom of the depression was
reached, and even more so for the years 1936 and 1937, when the
profit rate on operations was again high. If an increase in inven-
tories can be financed by selling securities at a profit, it is more
advantageous to do so than to draw on cash balances, provided no
further rise of security prices is expected. That the prices of bondsAnalysis of "Free" Cash 59
influence the amount of marketable securities held by corporations
is indicated by developments in the two years 1931 and 1933. In
those years, banks liquidated securities heavily for several months,
and the low prices made the purchase of such securities attractive
to corporations.
Summary
(1) The rise in corporate holdings of marketable securities in the twentks
is probably due to the attractive investment opportunity which the stock
exchange offered in those years as well as to the expansion of enterprise
which required a substantial amount of funds that were temporarily
invested in securities or lent on call.
(2) Such liquidation of marketable securities as occurred in the thirties can
probably be ascribed to the rise in the prices of bonds, and (after the
bottom of the depression was reached) to the rise in current assets for
which the sale of marketable securities provided part of the necessary
funds. The high bond prices made it advisable to finance an increase in
assets by drawing on marketable securities rather than on cash. In the
two years (1931 and 1933) when bond prices fell, the corporations pur-
chased marketable securities.
THE ROLE OF DIVIDENDS
No causal relationship exists between "free" cash and dividend
payments in the sense that the former determines the latter.8
Dividend payments (see Chart B-2 in Appendix B) tend to rise
and to fall with net income, not with the liquidity position of com-
panies. in the business contraction of the thirties, profits for our
sample of large manufacturing companies declined sharply (in
1932 net losses were incurred).In such a situation companies
reduce their dividend payments although, as a rule, the reduction
is not so great as the decline in net income would warrant. All
that can be said, therefore, is that "free" cash would have been
greater in the early thirties if the companies had reduced their
dividend payments still further.
8In1943 some companies reported that they increased their dividends becau8e they
had idle cash on hand. But it must be remembered that 1943 was also a year of
increased earnings; moreover, as a result of war material priorities, etc., there was
only a limited outlet for cash disbursement in the production sphere.